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Foreword
All governments assembled at the UN-Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993)
unanimously accepted the principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights. However,
authoritarian regimes in East and Southeast Asia more and more openly call the principle of
universality into question and refer to "Asian values" allegedly specific to their own cultural
traditions and values. Mahathir bin Mohamad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, recently went as
far as calling for a total revision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its
adjustment to new world affairs in which the West no longer has a cultural hegemony. There is
also an academic debate on the "cultural relativism" in the appropriate interpretation and
implementation of human rights.
What is the reaction of human rights groups and academic scholars from Asia, who cannot
be suspected of engaging in Western "cultural imperialism", to the challenge of "Asian values"?
This INEF-Report includes the following papers:
· two papers presented by Sri Lankan scholars to an international conference in Colombo
organized by the Goethe-Institute and the Sri Lanka Foundation;
· a paper by a political scientist from the Philippines read at the University of Duisburg in
summer 1997;
· a paper on the conditionality of foreign aid presented by the editor of this INEF-Report to
the above-mentioned international conference in Colombo, which was a fine example of an
intercultural dialogue.
If the universality of human rights is generally accepted, then the use of foreign aid for the
protection of human rights cannot be considered political blackmail. But this thesis is also a
matter of controversy between the North and the South and within the South.
With this documentation of discussion papers the INEF, being fully aware of the fact that
Global Governance will not be possible without common ethical principles as already laid
down in human rights covenants, wants to make a contribution to an intercultural dialogue by
offering a platform to voices of the South.
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The Human Rights Debate in the
Southeast Asian Region: Univer-
sality vs. Cultural Relativism
Reynaldo R. Ty
Introduction
The only thing in the world that is perma-
nent is change. From the 1960s to the
1980s, countries of Southeast Asia could
be classified as shifting from communism,
authoritarian dictatorship, semi-democracy
to democracy,1 what with the demise of the
erstwhile Soviet Union. Coup attempts,
bureaucratic politics, and military regimes
seem to be on the wane, while the institu-
tionalization of democracy seems to be on
the rise.
Furthermore, there is a changing rela-
tionship between society and development
that has great political consequences. We
are in the midst of turbulent changes in the
post-communist period. The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
does not remain untouched.2
Analysts argue as to whether industrial
modernization (market) has some correla-
tion with political modernization (which
includes democratization and human
rights). For the purpose of this paper, de-
mocratization and human rights will be
treated as closely related concepts, if not
used loosely as synonymous.
Given the rapid industrialization that is
taking place in the region, the "market" is
winning the day.3 Discussions about eco-
                                                 
1 cf. Neher 1991; Neher/Marlay 1995.
2 cf. Hewison/Robison/Rodan 1993; Ramage
1995; Schwarz 1994; Vatikiotis 1991.
3 cf. Przeworski 1991.
nomic modernization is oftentimes coupled
with discussions about political develop-
ment as well.4 In this context, human rights
play an important part in contemporary
political discourse.
With vigorous economies, many South-
east Asian leaders have been quite bold in
challenging the very core and notion of
human rights. Others are in periods of tran-
sition (Cambodia), while others still strate-
gically decide to remain mysteriously dead
silent on the matter (Sultan Bolkiah). With
economic wealth comes political voice.
Nevertheless, the contagious "Third
Wave of Democratization"5 i  the late
twentieth century which is characterized by
the voluntary or forcible dismantling of the
vestiges of dictatorship as well as non-vio-
lence, compromise, elections is infecting
the ASEAN region.
For the purpose of this paper, by human
rights is meant the whole set of 1) concerns
for development, environment, and peace,
2) economic, social and cultural rights in-
volving food, clothing, shelter, and social
services, and 3) civil and political rights
such as freedom from arbitrary state inter-
vention on individuals, all of which being
recognized under the corpus of interna-
tional law of human rights as recognized by
the United Nations, of which ASEAN
countries are members.
Drafted under the chairpersonship of
Eleanor Roosevelt, he Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights i  a document
which was adopted unanimously by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in
1948. Hence, this paper shall adopt the
universally accepted notion of human rights
based on international customary law as
                                                 
4 cf. Fukuyama 1995a.
5 cf. Huntington 1993.
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recognized under the auspices of the United
Nations.
1 Universality of Human Rights
Most of the literature about human rights
from the west sings praises only to the uni-
versality of human rights. U.S. concern for
human rights, for example, springs from its
concern for the creation and maintenance
of world peace and the spread of democ-
racy.
Former President Jimmy Carter syn-
thesized U.S. national security interests
with human rights, asserting that the U.S.
has responsibilities toward peace and hu-
man rights.6 Ronald Reagan, on his part,
considered "humanitarian inter-vention" as
a temporary expedient to ensure a minimum
standard of universally accepted human
rights to those living in especially difficult
situations.
George Bush said that "the 200-year
old Bill of Rights has remained a shining
symbol of liberty and a standard with which
to measure the legitimacy of American laws
and constitutions. It has become the foun-
dation of such documents as 1948's Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and
1975's Helsinki Final Act of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in
Europe."7
Ramsey Clark, the former U.S. Attor-
ney General, was more critical, saying: "We
preached democracy at home and sup-
ported a despot abroad ... we spoke of
freedom and sat in silence while thousands
were tortured and brutalized."8
                                                 
6 Department of State/Bureau of Public Affairs:
Speech before the World Jewish Congress,
Washington, D.C. 1977.
7 Commemoration of Human Rights
(Proclamation, 1992 December 8).
8 Newsweek, 1980 June 30.
Clinton's foreign policy towards the
Asia-Pacific region has a four-part strategy:
1) the U.S. maintains its core alliance with
Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand; 2) it shall pursue a policy of
engagement with other leading countries of
the region, not excluding former Cold War
enemies; 3) it supports a regional mecha-
nism for sustained economic growth, inte-
gration, and long-term stability; and, 4) it
supports democracy and human rights.9
The Clinton Administration has to
wrestle with U.S. business in balancing
between "national interests" and human
rights. On the one hand, the U.S. under
Clinton in the idealist tradition condemns
human rights violations in Burma, China,
and Indonesia. On the other hand, the U.S.
in the realist tradition continues to have
trade relations with the same countries
which it condemns for infringements of
human rights. The USAID democratic plu-
ralism initiative links U.S. foreign aid with
democracy and human rights in the same
way that Western Europe and Canada uses
aid to support democracy and sustainable
development.
In 1995, Doug Bereuter, Chairperson
of the Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific of the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives
said that the U.S. seeks "to advance the
fundamental principles of democracy, plu-
ralism, and human rights in Asia through
creative and effective use of bilateral, re-
gional, and multilateral approaches ... [By]
human rights and democratization ... we
mean the building of democratic institutions
in Asia and the Pacific. Experiences has
shown that not only do democracies em-
brace human rights, but they are also
                                                 
9 Christopher Warren: A Peaceful and a
Prosperous Asia-Pacific, in: Vital Speeches of
the Day, Vol. 61 (August 15, 1995): 642 ff.
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traditionally the most stable and reliable
trading partners and friends. Almost in-
variably, democracies do not make war on
other democracies, do not practice
terrorism, or generate refugees."10
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, claims that "there are Asian democ-
racies that equal those elsewhere, such as
Japan ... And there are authoritarian re-
gimes whose only concession to democracy
and human rights lies in their names or their
paper constitutions," adding that
"promoting human rights and democracy is
in the interest of the United States. Our
shared economic and security interests in
Asia are best served in the long run by a
political and social order that respects the
rule of law, where freedom of speech is a
safety valve, and where government is
accountable to its citizens ... Bilateral
diplomacy is the foundation of our human
rights policy."11
Based on the foregoing, the U.S. in par-
ticular and the west in general appear to be
indecisive as they send mixed signals.
Western injunctions about human rights
and exigencies for economic growth and
development may either converge or clash.
The governments of Southeast Asian
countries consider these acts as the "human
rights blackmail". The human rights record
of political regimes have a bearing on the
pronounced if not actual foreign aid alloca-
tions under different U.S. administrations.
                                                 
10 House of Representatives/Committee on
International Relations: Hearings before the
Subcommittees on International Economic
Policy and Trade and on International
Operations and Human Rights, Febrr. 2, 9;
March 16; June 27. 104
th
 Session 1995, pp.
78-79.
11 ibidem p. 89.
With the downfall of Soviet-style so-
cialism, some U.S. writers insist that mar-
ket capitalism and liberal democracy are the
f atures of the neo-Hegelian "End of
History".12 As the reality is much more
complex than expected, many ASEAN
leaders think otherwise, though. "Endism"
is seen as a Western fashion and ideology
which defend the status quo under Western
hegemony, rather than an empirical expla-
nation of the world as it is. Post-commu-
nism for many ASEAN governments is not
equal to the acceptance of the imposition of
Western values, including human rights
values.
2 "Asian Values" as a Response
to Western Monocultural Chau-
vinism
Eric C. Bjornlund, the Director of Asia
Programs of the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, notes
that some Southeast Asian leaders put for-
ward the argument according to which de-
mocracy is foreign to Asia and is antitheti-
cal to Asian economic development.13
Furthermore, Bjornlund adds that
authoritarian leaders have argued that hu-
man rights are relative, contingent on such
factors as culture and religion, that
Western-style democracy does not apply to
Asia, and that political rights clash with
economic growth. Oftentimes, it is the po-
litically self-protective Asian elites who
reject the notion of rights by claiming that
there is a necessary tradeoff between
collective economic, social, cultural rights
on the one hand and individual civil and
political rights.14
                                                 
12 Fukuyama 1992.
13 cf. Footnote No. 10, p. 115.
14 cf. Scoble/Wiseberg 1985.
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In contradiction to the claims that hu-
man rights are universal, opponents ad-
vance the "cultural relativism" argument
and assert that civilizational conflict arises
out of Western non-respect for the different
cultures of the world. As a result, there is
now a rich literature on the theory of
"Clash of Civilizations" both defending it
and attacking it.15 Johan Galtung ob-
served that "Western civilization under-
stands itself as the universal civilization and
universalizes its history as Development =
Modernization = Growth = Economic
growth = GNP growth."16
When former U.S. Secretary of State,
James A. Baker III, went to the July 24,
1991 meeting of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur,
he cited the American belief that demo-
cratic pluralism helps make societies re-
silient, dynamic, and responsive to popular
aspirations and supported the trend in
Southeast Asia toward political freedom
which he linked to the region's economic
growth.17
Advocates of the "Asian Value" school
of thought claim that Asian and Western
concepts of freedom, justice, and human
rights are different. Western ideals are alien
to Asians. They further add that Westerners
are arrogant and racist for imposing their
own ideals of individualism, democracy,
and human rights on Asia. Westerners are
criticized for sensationalism and for con-
centrating on the worst abuses in Asia
when they talk about human rights.
Many ASEAN leaders contend that
thanks to their indigenous Asian traditions
                                                 
15 cf. Huntington 1993.
16 cf. Galtung, Johan 1991: Twenty-Five Theses
on Development Theory and Practice, in:
Institut für Entwicklungsforschung/Bochum
(Lecture on November 29).
17 Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2 (1991,
August 5): 563.
(and not thanks to Western values), their
societies have achieved their national goals
of economic growth, political stability, and
social harmony. Johan Galtung notes that
"there are two major economic growth
regions in the world, the Jud o-Christian
(JC) and the Buddhist-Confucian (BC)
Southeast."18
Today, the governments of Southeast
Asian countries are implementing economic
liberalization policies and attract foreign
investments with varying degrees of suc-
ess. In the name of economic development
as well as peace and order, communist
leaders in mainland Southeast Asia as well
as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir have
been outspoken defenders of "Asian
values" against the imposition of "alien
Western values", which results in global
cultural homogenization. Campaigning
against "Western social evils", they even
attempt to censor the free flow of informa-
t on in the internet. Western liberalism is
lambasted for its focus on the individual. In
1991, Mahathir spoke at the United
Nations: "If democracy means to carry
guns; to flaunt homosexuality; to disregard
the institution of marriage; to disrupt and
damage the well-being of the community in
the name of individual rights; to destroy a
particular faith; to have privileged institu-
tions such as the press which are sacrosanct
even if they indulge in lies which undermine
society - if these are democracy's details,
cannot the new converts reject them?"19
Exhausted by its own deluge of individual-
ism, moral bankruptcy, democracy and lack
of discipline, Western civilization is con-
sidered weak and overstretched, claim the
proponents of "Asian values". Hence, the
                                                 
18 cf. Footnote No. 16.
19 Quoted in James Fallows: Rotten Royals, in:
Atlantic, June 1993: 46.
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East has the mission of leading the world
culturally and spiritually. Said M hathir:
"Europeans are living beyond their
means and are paid too much for too little
work. This lifestyle is the principal reason
behind Europe's recent turn toward pro-
tectionism, even as the more efficient
countries of East Asia develop prosperous
economies through free trade alone. Pro-
viding market access to East Asia's lower-
wage economies is seen as a threat to
Western living standards. Western ideals
such as democracy, meanwhile, are ex-
ported by Europe and America under the
assumption that all free market economies
must take place in free societies. The
example of the former Soviet Union shows
that this scenario is not always the case,
however. The free market should come
first; with its success, democratic reform
will follow. Europe and America may form
a protectionist trade bloc, but this action
will not stop the East Asian countries from
realizing their own right to develop them-
selves."20
Western governments and NGOs have
been charged by ASEAN governments as
dangerously capable masters in the art of
imposing monocultural Western Eurocen-
tric meta-narratives to the rest of the world
as "universals".
According to Carolina Hernandez,
areas where ASEAN and Western perspec-
tives diverge are the following: 1) univer-
salism vs. cultural relativism; 2) human
rights as part of national sovereignty vs.
global governance; 3) individualism vs.
communitarianism; 4) timing and sequenc-
ing of human rights imple-mentation; 5) aid
tied to human rights; and, 6) human rights
                                                 
20 Mahathir bin Mohamad 1993: Asia's Crescent
of Prosperity, in: New Perspectives Quarterly,
Vol. 10, 30-33.
as part of the social clause in multilateral
trade agreements.21
3 Synthesis
A. Limits of the Argument: "Asian
Values" as a Pretext to Justify
Human Rights Violations
The economic openness experienced in the
ASEAN region does not automatically
translate to greater political openness.
There are numerous structural, institu-
tional, operational and situational impedi-
ments to the promotion and protection of
human rights in the ASEAN states.
It is one thing to admit that Asia is a
culturally plural continent; yet, it is quite
another to use the logic of cultural plural-
ism as a political rhetoric as a justification
for authoritarianism. Instead of advancing
the cause of human rights from a multicul-
tural perspective by their rejection of a mo-
nocultural conception of human rights, they
sow hatred from which intercultural dia-
logue becomes impossible. Some Asian
governments misuse the concept of "Asian
values" which have nothing to do with
cultural relativism. More often than not, the
terms "Asian values" and "Asian democ-
racy" are used to mean authoritarian forms
of government. They have to be exposed
for this uncanny practice of confusing
"Asian values" with "authoritarianism".
Governments of ASEAN are not un-
known for the human rights violations
committed by the security forces.22 On
many occasions, human rights have been
violated in the name of national develop-
ment. To conceal the truth about human
                                                 
21 cf. Hernandez 1995.
22 cf. Amnesty International/Asia Watch: Annual
Reports.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE ASEAN 8
rights violations, many Southeast Asian
governments blur the issue by attacking and
countering Western claims of universalistic
human rights with equally ethnocentric and
xenophobic arguments about the greatness
of "Asian values" and the bankruptcy of
"Western values". Asian values have like-
wise been deliberately misrepresented by
some ASEAN leaders to serve specific po-
litical purposes.
Succinctly put, the so-called "Asian
Way" holds the contention according to
which communitarianism provides the
proper atmosphere for economic develop-
ment and consequently the Western notion
of democracy undermines economic
growth. The Confucian Ethic Hypothesis
(CEH) is advanced to explain the rise of
newly industrialized economies in Asia. The
Confucian Ethic Hypothesis emphasizes
education, diligent work ethic, order and
harmony, as well as group orientation.23 In
Southeast Asia, only two states - Vi tnam
and the city-state of Singapore - out of ten
countries can be properly classified as a
Confucian society. Lee Kuan Yew asserts
that his version of Asian Democracy which
focuses on discipline, communitarianism,
welfare, and job creation is popular since
the government is able to provide for all the
needs of the people. Critics, however, ar-
gue that it is rather the "hoary communist
bogey" that is responsible for the victory of
the People's Action Party during elections
since 1959 and it has nothing to do with the
Asian Democracy of Lee Kuan Yew.24
According to Clark Neher, "Asian Style
Democracy" is characterized by (1) patron-
client communitarianism; (2) personalism;
                                                 
23 cf. Sonoda 1991.
24 cf. Seow 1990.
(3) authority and hierarchy; (4) dominant
political party; and (5) strong state.25
"After nearly a decade of economic re-
form and political liberalization, several
countries in Southeast Asia are regressing.
The behavior of Indonesia's President
Suharto is indicative of the trend.
Suharto, who was hailed as a dynamic
advocate of free trade and modernization
in 1994, has since become obsessed with
tightening his family's hold on the nation's
wealth as his health declines. Moreover, as
host of a series of meetings of the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in late July [1996], he sounded
like a common dictator. Although the
ASEAN countries are making strides on
some fronts - they are slashing tariffs and
ave an enviable 8 percent average growth
rate - their penchant for money politics
could hamper efforts to embrace more so-
phisticated export industries. Furthermore,
critics believe that the failure to rein in
corruption and coddled cartels is begin-
ning to take its toll."26
Many of the countries in Southeast Asia
s owed an increasing trend of militariza-
tion. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand show the military
aking charge in decision making in the
economy, civil repression, and a significant
role of the military in the government.27
B. Filling the Gaps: Prospects for
Nurturing Asian Democracy
Based on the foregoing sections, there are
clearly divergent views on human rights.
Supporters of universalism and devotees of
cultural relativism enter into "pissing
                                                 
25 cf. Neher 1994.
26 cf. Business Week, 1996 August 5: 51.
27 cf. Tanter 1982.
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matches" and each side has as many devo-
tees as cynics. Western and ASEAN gov-
ernments differ in their interpretations in
the same way that ASEAN governments
differ from one another in their under-
standing thereof. Oftentimes, interlocutors
have been talking pass each other. Worse,
both sides are acrimonious and practise bad
faith. The notion of Asian Values is used as
a smokescreen for dictatorship and the
notion of universalism is used to impose
Western cultural imperialism. In the face of
multi-cultural assertions of identity, the
assumption of universality cannot sustain
the very core notion of human rights in the
world anymore. Hence, there is now a great
need to reexamine the concept of rights.
When Lee Kuan Yew delivered his now
classic sermon to Fidel Ramos, he said that
the Philippines has too much democracy
and that what is needed is discipline, to
which Ramos retorted by saying that that
choice is a false one as the people need
both food and freedom. Lee Kuan Yew
said: "Contrary to what American political
commentators say, I do not believe that
democracy necessarily leads to develop-
ment. I believe that what a country needs to
develop is discipline more than democracy.
The exuberance of democracy leads to un-
disciplined and disorderly conditions."28
However, for a while, democratization
in the Philippines had little regional impact
because the country's economic perform-
ance did not make it an attractive political
model for its neighbors in the ASEAN.29
Thailand's democratization is due to a
domestic crisis of authoritarianism rather
than a demonstration effect from the
Philippines. There is so much talk about
democracy and human rights in the
                                                 
28 cf. Manila Chronicle, 1992 November: 10.
29 cf. Thompson 1993.
Philippines but the Philippines is character-
ized by "a traditional landed elite dominat-
ing key social institutions; a patronage-
oriented civil service and political parties;
industrialists protected from domestic and
foreign competition; massive unemploy-
m nt. The result is an economy that ... can-
not distribute income fairly and cannot pay
it  debts. Under such circumstances, pros-
p cts for democracy are bleak."30
But the situation is changing. "Pour la
troisième année consécutive, l'économie a
connu une croissance positive (4,8%), con-
firmant ainsi son redressement. Preuve de
ce renouveau, la balance des paiements a
été excédentaire grâce aux transfers finan-
ciers effectués par les 3 millions d'expatriés
(6 millards de dollars), la croissance des
exportations (+ 26% au 1er trimestre 1996)
et l'afflux des capitaux étrangers. Dans ce
c ntexte, dix ans après la chute du dicta-
teur Ferdinand Marcos, les Philippines ont
entrepris d'exporter pour 50 milliards de
dollars de biens d'ici à l'an 2000."31
"Leaders of ASEAN's pseudo- and
semidemocracies argued that they had
established democratic forms suitable to
domestic conditions while making sure
their citizens had no chance to compare
them with actual democracy. While ethnic
integration proved compatible with democ-
racy in the Philippines and Thailand, the
other major ASEAN states claimed that
national unity required tight political con-
trol. International pressure for political
liberalization was countered by attacks on
Western arrogance that helped shore up
support at home. It was easier to blunt the
ideological challenge of democracy in
ASEAN than elsewhere in the developing
world because of the region's impressive
                                                 
30 cf. Robinson 1991: 320 ff.
31 cf. Lechervy 1997: 473.
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economic growth. But a fast growing
economy alone was not enough to head off
democratization, as Thailand's military
rulers discovered. Greater state interven-
tion and more elaborate ideological justi-
fication allowed nondemocratic regimes in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to link
prosperity and stability to their continued
rule."32
At the risk of oversimplification and at
the expense of precision, it can be simplisti-
cally stated that Western governments and
NGOs focus on civil and political rights,
while ASEAN governments and NGOs
emphasize economic, social, and cultural
rights. Civil society, to which ASEAN
NGOs belong, nevertheless, are at odds
with state interests and interpretations of
human rights. Student uprising, citizen par-
ticipation, and multi-party politics have
changed the course ASEAN politics.
More than ever, activist NGOs in Asia
today play a key role in pressuring govern-
ments to formulate and implement policies
as they relate to human rights and democ-
racy.33 Theories of global politics do not
only focus on international and regional
organizations, the state, and domestic non-
state actors but also transnational NGOs as
playing important roles in social transfor-
mation.34 "The unexpected influence of this
relatively powerless social movement is
traced to a symbolic logic of collective ac-
tion - which used legitimacy and informa-
tion as political resources to transform the
public political agenda, appeal to an inter-
national 'human rights regime', challenge
emerging democratic institutions and re-
construct citizenship. [NGO] strategies
                                                 
32 cf. Thompson 1993.
33 cf. Susan Berfield: Activist Power Hits Asia,
in: Asiaweek, 1996 December 6: 20.
34 cf. Wright 1989.
enabled the human rights movement to
survice authoritarian rule and catalyze
sweeping reforms ..."35
Many ASEAN governments have con-
ended that the question of human rights is
a  internal matter. However, NGOs assert
that "as human rights are of universal con-
cern and are universal in value, the advo-
cacy of human rights cannot be considered
to be an encroachment upon national
overeignty".36
Imposing Western values of human
rights as "universals" to non-Western
societies is unstable and unsustainable as it
is unnatural. The Philippines photocopied
the U.S. model of democracy and ended up
having the best aspects of it in writing and
the worst aspects of it in reality. The same
goes for the semi-democracy of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.37
On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung
asserts that the claim of Asia's values as
a ti-democratic is a myth.38 Risking their
own lives, people who participated in
spontaneous people's uprising and social
movements in Burma, the Philippines,
Thailand and elsewhere expressed their
opposition to the government. Societies
change in the same way that human rights
values are not made once and for all. In-
tead of seeking to accept or reject one
school of thought over the other (East vs.
West), the challenge is to assimilate differ-
ent social, historical, cultural emphases on
human rights into a diachronic and mul-
ticultural understanding of human rights.
H nce, ASEAN governments - without
having to abandon "Asianness" - must face
                                                 
35 cf. Brysk 1991.
36 cf. Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human
Rights (1993).
37 cf. Neher/Marlay 1995.
38 cf. Footnote No. 10: 115.
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the challenge of expanding political options
along with economic liberalizations.
International relations seen exclusively
from the perspective of governmental ac-
tors do not explain fully the dynamics of
politics. Given the multivocality and
polysemy of discourses on human rights,
contrary to the claims of some outspoken
public officials in the region, the different
governments (e.g. Lee Kuan Yew vs.
Ramos) of the ASEAN region do not
speak with one voice. Added to the already
complex debate is a thick layer of ASEAN
NGO positions on the subject. The center
of gravity shifts to members of social
movements who in spite of the risks with
which they are faced speak out and make
known their commitment to democracy and
human rights pressure regimes for
change.39 "Native-born" Southeast Asian
NGOs compete with governments in
voicing the "Southeast Asian" conceptions
of human rights. Social movements that are
engaged in collective action, while recog-
nizing the cultural diversity of the region,
appeal to an international human rights
regime.40
While ASEAN governments are busy
pitting the East versus the West, ASEAN
NGOs are busy working at the grassroots
level. Compared to governmental priorities,
NGOs have very different concerns. Their
notions of human rights go beyond the tra-
ditional civil liberties to include issues re-
lated to life, survival, self-determination,
the environment, women, children, indige-
nous peoples, land reform, and labor
unions.41
                                                 
39 ibidem: 90.
40 cf. Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human
Rights (1993).
41 cf. Scoble/Wiseberg 1985.
A tension exists between the universal
claim for human rights and the cultural
relativist views about them. There is a need
to develop a new understanding of the
foundations of ASEAN societies which are
eeply influenced by the cultural ethos
common to some countries of the region.
When talking about human rights,
Westerners tend to focus on the civil and
political aspects of rights, while ASEAN
leaders tend to focus on the economic as-
pects of rights. ASEAN NGOs appear to
be as sophisticated as ASEAN governments
in their response to questions of universal-
ity and cultural relativism of human rights.
Surely there are differences between the
societies of Southeast Asia. Surely, too,
democracy is not an original Asian tradi-
tion, nor was it an immutable reality in the
Western world as well. However, cultures
are not isolated or independent units;
rather, they are dynamic and interrelated
entities that rely on inter-subjective and
inter-penetrating criteria of inclusion or
exclusion. Nevertheless, the lack of a neu-
tral framework does not hinder the
existence and development of a cross-cul-
tural conception of human rights. Today, as
the winds of change are blowing across the
region, democracy is evolving in Southeast
A ia. There are, however, obstacles during
this period of transition.
Dwight King asserts that at least in
Indonesia, groups rights and individual
rights can be achieved simultaneously. "The
fulfilment of the individuals within the
g oup and [the Indonesians] value harmo-
nious social appearances ... Certainly Indo-
nesians talk about an organic unity and say
that fulfilment consists of being part of the
societal body, but there is simultaneously a
concept of individual fulfilment."42
                                                 
42 in: Lum 1988: 67.
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Seven months prior to the World Con-
ference on Human Rights of 1993, Yusuf
Wanandi of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) of Indonesia
wrote that "the issues of human rights, en-
vironment and democracy in the ASEAN
countries ... should be placed at the top of
ASEAN's agenda because relations among
nations are undergoing a fundamental
change."43 The ASEAN-ISIS proposed
several guiding principles for the formula-
tion of policy approaches on and policy
responses to human rights and democracy.
These are the principles of (1) interdepend-
ence, (2) comprehensiveness, (3) situational
uniqueness, (4) cooperation, not conflict,
(5) uniform criteria for conditionalization,
(6) sanctions as a last resort, (7) non-dis-
crimination, and (8) addressing the interna-
tional and domestic dimension.44
The U.N. World Conference in Vienna
in 1993 argued for the interdependence of
development, democracy, and human
rights. The Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action is an official document
of the U.N., of which ASEAN states are
member states. Clearly, the world is wit-
nessing the greater convergence of interest
in favor of human rights (in both the eco-
nomic and political aspects) globally by all
governments, ASEAN states not excluded.
Finally, Asia and the West see eye to eye
under the auspices of the U.N. in the hu-
man rights conference in Vienna.
The focus of attention must be on the
convergence, not divergence, in the under-
standing and implementation of human
rights. Then, that would be another step
forward in ASEAN internal politics and
international relations.
                                                 
43 Wanandi 1992: 1.
44 ibidem.
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Universality vs. Cultural
Relativism in Human Rights:
The Debate and a Response
Jayadeva Uyangoda
Introduction
The recently re-emerged debate on the uni-
versality vs. cultural particularism in human
rights perhaps represents a third phase in
the world-wide debate in human rights in
general. In the first phase, the focus of the
debate was defining universally acceptable
norms, definitions and standards of civil
and political rights. The second phase was
characterized by the expansion of the ambit
of rights to include economic, social and
cultural rights as well as to extend the con-
ceptual scope of human rights to specific
human communities such as the indigenous
peoples, women and children. In the third
phase, however, the debate has moved to a
different plain-- to re-examine the philo-
sophical, theoretical and civilizational foun-
dations of the hitherto accepted human
rights discourse itself.
Until recently, except in the arguments
of socialist jurisprudence and political
theory, the Human Rights philosophy was
based on the assumption that the rights as
enunciated in the UN charter and other
documents of the international community
had a universal relevance, validity and
application irrespective of social, cultural,
economic, political or historical contexts of
the states in the world. When preparatory
regional meetings were held before the UN
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993, a whole new debate erupted chal-
lenging that philosophical principle. Some
governments as well as civil society activ-
ists of the non-Western World constituted
themselves a kind of vanguard to forcefully
argue that the universality principle was an
essential component of the Western dis-
course of dominance over the non-Western
world.45 They further argued that the non-
Western societies should develop their own
philosophy, principles and standards of
Human Rights, quite independent of, and as
against, what they viewed as the discourse
of the "dominant West".46 This debate quite
interestingly took a political character, in-
voking such polemical categories as West
vs. the East, North vs. the South, dominant
vs. the dominated, and developed vs. the
developing.
In the preparatory debate mentioned
above, the Asian and African countries that
pressed for re-thinking and review of the
universality principle saw themselves as a
specific group of nations in the world
community, endowed with characteristics
different from the Western nations. For
example, the preamble to the San Jose
declaration of the Latin American states
reaffirmed that
"[O]ur countries represent a broad
grouping of nations sharing common roots
within a rich cultural heritage based on a
combination of various peoples, religions
and races, and that our roots unite us in
the search for collective solutions to
present problems through friendly dia-
logue, peaceful coexistence and respect for
pluralism and the principles of national
sovereignty, non-interference in the inter-
                                                 
45 Governments that reject the universality of
human rights include China, Cuba, Colombia,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia,
Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, Syria,
Vietnam and Yemen.
46 I borrow this term from Chandra Muzaffar of
Malaysia who is an influential thinker of the
'cultural relativist' school of thought and whose
arguments I will examine later in this paper.
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nal affairs of states and self-determination
of peoples."47
The Bangkok Declaration of Asian
States, meanwhile, stressing the univer-
sality argued for "objectivity and non-se-
lectivity of all human rights and the need to
avoid the application of double standards in
the implementation of human rights and its
politicization." It also urged (the actual
term used in the Declaration is recognizing)
that "the promotion of human rights should
be encouraged by cooperation and consen-
sus, and not through confrontation and the
imposition of incompatible values"48
Peter Van Ness (1995:3) summarizes
the main issues involved in this global de-
bate:
i. The question of universality versus cul-
tural or developmental universalism:
whether human rights should be under-
stood as universal principles applying to
all humanity, or as values shaped essen-
tially by the particularities of each na-
tion.
ii. The so-called right to intervene versus
the state-sovereignty against inter-na-
tional intervention to resist human
rights abuse.
iii. Competing priorities among different
categories of human rights, especially:
(a) civil and political rights versus eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, and
(b) individual rights versus collective or
group rights.
iv. Concepts of individual rights versus
citizen duties.
v. Issues having to do with the rights of
indigenous peoples.
                                                 
47 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for
Latin America and the Caribbean of the World
Conference on Human Rights, San Jose,
January 1993; quoted in Cerna (1994): 742.
48 Quoted in Cerna (1994): 743.
vi. Whether human rights conditions should
be attached to economic and techno-
logical assistance programs.
Global Context
The global context in which this debate has
recently re-emerged has a number of con-
stitutive components. The seeming triumph
of Western capitalism as a generalized
global economic order and its political,
ideological and cultural consequences led
to a resurgence of intellectual nationalism
in the non-Western world. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
socialist bloc in a way placed the Western
world in a position of unassailability, ger-
minating a definite sense of renewed resis-
tance to the West among new
nationalists.49 When the ideologues of the
Western triumphalism -- notably Samuel
Huntington and Francis Fukuyama --
came out with visions of impending cultural
conflict on a global scale and of the end of
ideology as totalizing grand narratives of
new globalism around the core of Western
i dustrial civilizations, it infuriated some
sections of the radical and nationalist
intelligentsia so much that they developed
arguments for new alliances with the states
f the non- Western world to combat the
new 'global evil.' The Gulf War, once
described by James Petras as the actual
Third World War, in a way crystallized
sentiments towards intellectual and political
resistance against the Western project.
Economic globalization that has created
much intellectual resistance, provides a
backdrop for the debate on human rights
too. As cleverly argued by some post-
modernist theorists, globalization erases
                                                 
49 I used the term `nationalist´ here not
necessarily in its ethnic sense, but in its ethno-
centric and cultural relativist sense.
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local or regional specificities, arbitrarily
imposes homogenization on diversity and
practices violence against local resistance.
Resistance to globalization -- political,
cultural, epistemological and informatio-
nal -- is thus viewed as the morally right
and just counter-hegemonic political pro-
ject. The nostalgia for, and the commitment
to preserve, things local and non-Western
has thus become a fairly strong current in
today's radical thinking.
Arguments for Cultural Relativism
In this section I will summarize the cultural
relativist approach to human rights. My
strategy is to initially summon one of its
most articulate spokespersons, Chandra
Muzaffar, who is also the leading
"Asianist" in the debate, and then examine
the implications of the general approach
developed in this school of thought. At the
International Conference on Rethinking
Human Rights, held in Kuala Lumpur/
Malaysia in December 1994, Muzaffar
presented a paper entitled "From Human
Rights to Human Dignity", an abridged
version of which was later published in the
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in
1995. I will use that paper to illustrate his
approach and arguments, although his po-
sition has been developed in a number of
previous essays and public lectures.50
Chandra Muzaffar's (hereafter CM)
starting point is that the universality of HR
argument is deeply embedded in the
Western project for global domination.
Therefore, the West has no moral right to
be concerned with human rights in the non-
West, because it has historically violated
                                                 
50 Human Rights and the New World Order
(1993), published by the Just World Trust,
Penang Malaysia, contains most of Muzaffar's
essays on the subject.
Human rights and dignity of the non-white
people, has failed to uphold some funda-
mental rights of its own people, and con-
tinues to support dictatorships that sup-
press genuine human rights and democracy
movements in its quest to perpetuate global
domination.
As we know, the universality notion is
foregrounded on the liberal philosophical
principle of the sovereignty of the individ-
ual in the public sphere. Cultural relativists
question this fundamental principle of the
mainstream HR discourse on the argument
that not all cultures, particularly the Asian
ones, privilege the individual in the same
way the Western tradition does. The argu-
ment then is for a cultural specific locus of
the rights. CM critiques the Western notion
of individualism asking the following ques-
tions (I will quote CM fully on the question
of individualism to capture the rhetorical
essence of his intervention):
i. "Is the glorified but often destructive
individualism of an earlier phase in Western
history now more clearly a gross, vulgar
individualism that today threatens the very
fabric of Western democracy? Isn't indi-
vidualism of this sort a negation of the
community?"
ii.  "Has the glorification and adulation
of individual freedom as an end in
itself reached a point where individual
freedom has become the be-all and
end-all of human existence? Isn't
freedom in the ultimate analysis a
means towards a greater good rather
than an end in itself?"
The critique of the individual-centered
rights discourse stems from a communi-
tarian perspective which posits the non-
Western conception of the self as funda-
mentally grounded on the group, the com-
munity or the collectivity independent of
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which the individual existence is perceived
to have little or no meaning.
Hence CM´s query: "Isn't this
[individual] notion of freedom linked in the
West to an idea of rights that is often
divorced from responsibilities? Can rights
be separated from responsibilities in real
life?"
This critique is linked to another point,
namely the `overemphasis´ by the Western
and West-inspired HR community on civil
and political rights, at the expense of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. CM else-
where states in a critique of Amnesty
International´s agenda:
"... Amnesty, like most Western govern-
ments, emphasizes human rights practices
and human rights violations which come
within the ambit of political and civil
liberties... [E]conomic and social rights
have received much less emphasis than
they deserve. The human right to food, to
clothing, to shelter, to education, to health,
to employment is fundamental to the very
survival of the human being ... Of what use
is the human rights struggle to the poverty-
stricken billions of the South if it does not
liberate them from hunger, from homeless-
ness, from ignorance, from disease?
Human rights interpreted mainly in terms
of political and civil rights will not satisfy
the quest of the poor for human dignity
and social security."51
The argument presented here is plain,
simple and very clear. One can only do is to
attach a label to it -- the empty-belly, or
human dignity perspective. But, to be fair
by Muzaffar, it needs to be pointed out that
he calls for "a more holistic, integrated
vision of human rights" in which "life and
liberty, food and freedom should go hand in
hand." This proposal for a holistic vision is
                                                 
51 Muzaffar (1993): 12-13.
not without problems and we shall examine
them later. Before that a brief comment on
the empty-belly perspective of human rights
is necessary. Simply put, this perspective
says that there is no point at all in telling a
starving person that she must assert her
civil and political rights.52 For the hungry,
the homeless, the sick and the unemployed,
he argument goes, human rights are mere
abstract concepts. Much of the experience
in many Asian, African and Latin American
s cieties, however, presents a totally con-
trasting picture of the relationship between
belly and the rights: almost as a rule, it is
often the empty-bellied who become the
first targets of rights violations by the state.
When it comes to the denial of the rights of
the empty-bellied, all state agencies tend to
act with impunity.
Taking the Relativism Argument
Seriously
Even if one may not totally agree with the
cultural relativism perspective of Human
Rights, one has to grant that it is a politi-
cally evocative one which can quite easily
ruffle the Western intellectuals.53 However,
one may still recognize that it raises some
disturbing issues to be confronted by uni-
versalists in the developing world. Let me
cite one such issue, political conditionality
in development aid adopted by Western
governments and multi-lateral lending in-
stitutions who dominate the global econ-
omy. The annual aid group meetings in
                                                 
52 An Indian official attending the Colombo
SAARC Summit in 1991 put across this point
of view graphically when he said: If you don´t
have enough food in your stomach, talking of
human rights is a little abstract (cited in
Pravada, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1992, p. 36).
53 For such a knee-jerk response, highly
enjoyable though, to the cultural relativist
argument, see Johan Galtung 1992: 152 -176.
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Paris, which decide the development aid
policy towards individual aid recipient
countries, is an instance where the global
economic agenda of industrialized countries
- which by the way are located in both
West and the East! - has to some extent co-
opted the international human rights com-
munity. The cultural relativists see this as
an unholy alliance designed to bully and
coerce the weaker nations in the developing
world and the nationalist resistance to it
can sometimes legitimize in the public eye
even the very practices that the interna-
tional HR community would abhor. The
other side of the story, of course, is that the
political conditionality of development aid
has not always been a level- playing field
when even absolutely repressive regimes
are allied with more powerful nations in the
West. Smarter regimes of weak nations -
perhaps Sri Lanka has been a good case in
point - learn quickly how to overcome the
concerns of the international community on
the requirements of political conditionality
of aid.
My own response to this issue is con-
cerned with the political-strategic utility of
international mobilization in the struggle for
democratization in our societies. And it is
largely linked to the behavior of the Sri
Lankan state during the past few years.
One of the most disquieting aspects of the
authoritarian political practices of many
states of the developing world has been the
total disregard for domestic political pres-
sure on even very grave human rights vio-
lations. With occasional exceptions, re-
gimes often behave with a conviction of
impunity and the domestic human rights
communities are their prime targets when-
ever the civil society begins to assert itself
against repressive regime behavior. In
situations where democratic institutional
mechanisms are either weak or non-
existent, ensuring of the state/regime
accountability becomes extremely difficult.
And indeed, regimes often behave on the
as umption that accountability to domestic
constituencies is totally irrelevant, un-
acceptable and inimical to national - one
ay even say 'community' - interests. How-
ever, the Sri Lankan experience since the
late eighties clearly indicates that in a con-
text of global economic and political rela-
tions with which the state is so intimately
linked, the international community - states,
multi-lateral lending institutions and HR
groups - is the only constituency that a re-
gime may view itself accountable for.54 At
times when domestic mechanisms of
checks-and-balances of state behavior are
weakened by the regime itself, the interna-
tional community is perhaps the sole effec-
tive agency for checking arbitrary practices
of the state, however much it may infuriate
state fetishists.
In this backdrop, we in Asia need not at
all feel ashamed of being members of a new
global community, the international civil
society. If there is any historically mean-
ingful internationalism today, it is the
                                                 
54 A clear illustration of my argument is the
immediate response that the Premadasa
administration had to make when Amnesty
International made, in September 1991, thirty
two recommendations to the Sri Lankan
government on the improvement of the human
rights situation in the country. This was the
time when the domestic HR groups and
oppositionist communities were under siege,
after two to three years of very grave human
rights violations by the state. The government
in December 1991 accepted most of the 32
recommendations. The context of this
acceptance was characterized by the
forthcoming Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting in
Paris and the UN Commission on Human
Rights in Geneva, scheduled for February,
1992. Among the matters scheduled to be
discussed in Geneva was the Report of the UN
Working Group on Disappearances that visited
Sri Lanka in October, 1991.
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democratic internationalism to which the
human rights community is committed. At
least in Sri Lanka, it is the international civil
society which has been functioning, with
limitations of course, as a democratic safe-
guard against the arbitrary state practices,
when the nationalists, neo-stalinists, nativ-
ists and cultural purists had legitimized the
authoritarian state in more than one way.
Cultural Relativism as Civilizational
Determinism
There is an interesting set of quasi- philo-
sophical issues, too, involved in the cultural
relativist critique. What is the relationship
between the individual and the state in the
non-Western world? Is it fundamentally
different from that of the West? Is in the
non-West the individual in fact secondary
to the community and is the community -
nation, ethnic group, caste group, religious
group etc - the fundamental unit of human
existence? Is the non- West devoid of any
concept of the self anchored on notions of
sovereignty of the individual?
The cultural relativist responses to these
questions are anchored in a world view
which may be called `civilizational deter-
minism.´ It understands the world in terms
of distinct civilizations - ironically remind-
ing us of the Huntingtonian understanding
of the world as an ensemble of antagonistic
civilizations. Such formulations as Asian
values or African values of human rights
are derived from a discourse of civiliza-
tional specificity, posited in opposition to
the West. Thus, the Bangkok Declaration´s
preamble recognized that "while human
rights are universal in nature, they must be
considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-set-
ting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds"55.
An extreme manifestation of this argu-
ment is that Human Rights, as concep-
tualized in the West, are irrelevant to Asian
and African societies, since the communi-
arian self-understanding of people in these
societies does not carry the notion of indi-
vidual self. Rhoda Howard ( 1990) cites
some African advocates of this position.
Fasil Nahuman, for instance, argues that
Africa has its own specific concept of hu-
manism which "does not alienate the indi-
vidual by seeing him as an entity all by him-
self, having an existence more or less inde-
pendent of society." Another spokesperson,
Asmarom Legessee, makes the claim that
"no aspect of Western civilization makes an
African more uncomfortable than the con-
cept of the sacrilized individuals whose
private wars against society are celebrated."
Another writer quoted by Howard com-
pletes the argumentative logic of this asser-
tion: "The Africans assume harmony, not
divergence of interests ... and are more
inclined to think of their obligations to
other members of society rather than their
claims against them."56
                                                 
55 Quoted in Cerna (1994): 743.
56 All cited in Howard (1990): 162. An Asian
version of the Africanist argument is
articulated by Muzaffar as follows: "Unlike
Western governments which see human rights
as rights revolving around the individual, there
is in Asia and Africa in particular a strong
notion of the rights of the collectivity, the
community, the nation. This has a lot to do
with the colonial experience of Asian and
African states. Subjected to alien, colonial rule
for centuries, fighting for freedom for whole
generations of Asians and Africans came to
mean fighting for the freedom of their people.
There is, therefore, a concept of collective
freedom and the rights that go with that
freedom in the historical baggage of the Asian
and African. This explains why freedom for
most post-colonial societies has been more
than a litany of personal liberties. It is a
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The centrality of the communal compo-
nent of the African persons' self-making
needs not be disputed even for the sake of
the argument. Anthropological studies on
African societies have repeatedly confirmed
this. Even in the United States where
modern individualistic spirit runs supreme,
community principle is not totally absent
even among urban communities. All indi-
vidual construction of the self, whether in
Asia, Africa or in the West has a communal
or group dimension at varying degrees. In
Africa, commmunal dimensions of the self
may perhaps be stronger. Yet, there is a
definitely uncomfortable ring around this
claim for African absence of the individu-
ality. Only a few decades ago, rulers like
Nkrumah in Ghana and Nyerere in
Tanzania used the same argument to
buttress the ideology of a highly repressive
and authoritarian system of governance.
Nkrumah's ideology of African Socialism or
Nyerere's concept of Ujama socialism cele-
brated the community principle in political
projects only to bring disaster to entire
communities. This illustrates a demonstra-
bly definite danger in the communitarian
argument: it, unlike the citizen's rights ar-
gument, can be easily appropriated and
deployed by repressive states as well as
                                                                    
collective ideal inextricably intertwined with
the quest of whole communities, of entire
nations for human dignity and social justice
(Muzaffar 1993: 13-14). This paragraph is
illustrative of the general tendency among
cultural relativists to treat communities, ethnic
groups and nations as undifferentiated, organic
entities where power, domination, inequality
and oppression within the so-called
collectivities is totally obviated and
unaccounted for. The way it fetishizes 'freedom
struggles' of the Asians and the Africans is
nicely de-constructed by the post-colonial
history of many of these states which have
perpetrated violence against ethnic, religious
and caste minorities of their own
'collectivities.'
right-wing communities -- like the religious
right in the U.S. -- to deny both individual
and collective rights of people. To reiterate
the last point, the principle of individual-
based civil and political rights can hardly be
appropriated by a repressive state against
its own citizenry.
In the Asian context, the same danger of
the communitarian argument of rights
exists, along with another paradox. Unlike
the African continent in general, the Asian
region represents a historically more ad-
vanced stage of capitalist development.
Although Western liberal democratic insti-
tutions have not taken roots in many Asian
societies, their economies are based on a
complex web of market relations where the
individual enters into transactions on a pri-
marily capitalistic matrix. Asian capitalism
cannot be seen as having re-shaped the
Western capitalism in Asian societies in any
communitarian fashion, except in giving
rise to a repressively paternalistic regime of
c pital - labour relations. It thrives pre-
cisely on the individualistic market rela-
tions. The paradox of Asia then is the ro-
bust expansion of modern capitalism
ound industry and the market in a
sizeable area of the region along an essen-
tially Western pattern while political insti-
tutions have not. Any communitarian ex-
planation should be utilized not to justify
this paradox, but to unravel it. The query
then should be: what is wrong with indi-
vidual political rights when a mode of pro-
duction of market economies, competitive
i dividualism, and individual economic de-
cision-making has become dominant, he-
gemonic and obviously unstoppable. It is
precisely because the fast expanding capi-
talist production and exchange relations are
tearing asunder traditional patron-client
relations between the social group and the
state that individual citizen-based civil and
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political rights become all the more relevant
for Asia.
There is yet another side of this prob-
lem: in the developing world, it is not the
capitalist market which atomizes the so-
ciety through individuation of human rela-
tions. The state, through all its repressive,
interventionist, controlling and disciplinary
procedures atomizes the society as much as
the market does. The ultimate essence of all
repressive practices of the state is to treat
society on the basis of individuals. The unit
of human society that suffers arbitrary
arrest, torture, rape, extrajudicial execution
etc., is ultimately the individual. The denial
of human dignity by the state is charac-
teristically and primarily practiced at the
level of the individual.
The communitarian argument is fraught
with another danger: its hidden assumption
that non-Western societies are organic
communities where the individual is cared
for, looked after and given protective
refuge by the collectivity. Except in the
fertile imagination of the agrarian or tribal
romanticist, this assumption can rarely be
substantiated in actual societies where in-
ternal differentiation, hierarchies and divi-
sions negate principles of equality, justice
and fairness. Community egalitarianism in
Asian and African societies has been a
perennial myth among some moderns and
anti\-post-moderns, orientalists and occi-
dentalists alike. It is also a legacy of nation-
alist narrativization of local histories. But
communities are sharply differentiated
along class, caste and hierarchical lines and
the advent of the modern state with its per-
vasive presence in society has sharpened
the antagonisms within communities, the
state agencies often being partisan towards
the upper class, upper caste and privileged
strata of communities.
This is exactly where a fundamental
weakness of the cultural relativism argu-
ment of human rights reveals itself. The
argument either ignores the question of the
state or when it treats the state as an issue,
it is often unproblematized in a manner that
can be described as state fetishism. It is an
argumentative fallacy to treat individual
rights as disrupting communitarian princi-
ples, even if we accept the point that in
Asia and Africa the community has su-
premacy over the individual. What the dis-
course and practice of civil and political
rights does is the protection of the individ-
u l as well as the community against the
rbitrary will of the state, not against the
community in its pluralistic sense. If a state
claims to represent one specific community
-- ethnic or tribal group in the name of the
nation -- as against the others, as it often
happens in the contemporary world, can the
dispossessed, marginalized and victimized
communities seek justice by invoking
community rights?
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Women´s Rights as Human
Rights
Sepali Kottegoda
"Women suffer from violations of their
human dignity and human rights in many
different ways...A denial of the right to
adequate housing or food may affect all
the poor of a society, but if, for example,
the division of labour within that society
assigns primary responsibility to women
for such tasks as collecting firewood, wa-
ter, and food, then women's experience of
the denial of those rights will be different
in importance from that of men."57
Debate and discussion on women's hu-
man rights entered the mainstream thinking
on human rights in general with the recog-
nition and inclusion of the human rights of
women on to the agenda of the United
Nations World Conference on Human
Rights held in Vienna in 1993. This major
achievement in advancing the rights of
women was the result of many years of
campaigning, organising and sharing of
women's experiences of violations of their
rights across the world spearheaded by the
Global Campaign for Women's Human
Rights, a broadbased international move-
ment against violence against women. This
paper presents an overview of some of the
main themes in the current debates in the
field of women's human rights and attempts
to look at these and examine briefly their
relevance and impact within the Sri Lankan
women's rights concerns.
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Gender and Human Rights
In recent history, the mobilisation of politi-
cal forces towards the recognition of
women's rights, particularly in the West,
began with the suffragette movement in the
early part of this century demanding the
right for women to vote in democratic so-
cieties. Within a few decades, the needs
hus articulated evolved as full fledged
women's movements in both the West and
the East, which addressed and continue to
address a much wider range of issues from
the right to income, education, health,
housing, freedom from harassment, to
sexual rights and reproductive rights.
Much of the rights debate stems from
the Liberal Democratic perspective that
individuals are free independent beings
who, provided that the environment is
sympathetic to their social positions and
needs in society, are able to exercise their
rights through rational agency58. The
recognition of women's rights as an issue
separate from the overall discussion on
human rights is premised on the fact that
women face discrimination and violence
across the public and private spheres in
fo ms which are distinct and different from
those faced by men. Underlying this
situation is the fact that women's rights are
violated as a result of their gendered
identities as women.
The application of the Rights codified in
the two human rights covenants of the
United Nations, namely, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
d the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights in
terms of state accountability exemplifies the
ideological biases governing their concep-
tualisation. Whereas the Convenant on
Civil and Political Rights gives an indi-
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vidual the right to seek redress f'rom the
state, for example in situations of violations
of civil or political rights the economic,
social and cultural rights in the second
covenant are perceived and formulated in
terms of the state's duty to provide protec-
tion: here the shift in emphasis also leaves
open space for a state to refrain from tak-
ing action based on this Covenant on
grounds, for example, of culture59.
With growing awareness and recogni-
tion of the extent and nature of women's
rights violations across countries, societies
and cultures, in particular in the case of
violence against women, many women's
rights activists are sharply critical of this
formulation of 'rights' which, they argue,
implies an artificial separation of the public
and the private spheres of society60. Cri ics
argue that such an arbitrary separation re-
flects an ideological bias which fails to
acknowledge the pervasive gender im-
balances in power distribution and hierar-
chical structures in social and political in-
stitutions which it is contended, the state
(public sphere) cannot/should not intervene
in what takes place in social units such as
households or families (the so-called pri-
vate sphere).
The drawing of firm links between the
public and private spheres and the initiating
discussion and recognition of women's
rights has been one of the major themes of
Feminism which has emerged as a strong
political movement across the globe as the
20th century draws to a close. Common to
the many strands of feminism is an under-
lying acknowledgement of the need to
evolve new strategies which continue to
exert pressure on the state to ensure the
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60 Ibidem
betterment of the lives of women and the
empowerment of women within their so-
cial, economic and cultural contexts.
International efforts
At the international level, the efforts to
win recognition for  women´s rights has
seen the establishment of new legal frame-
works and institutional mechanisms dealing
with women's rights which have expanded
on the existing traditional liberal conceptu-
alisation of political rights and freedoms as
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the two Covenants
cited above. The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW), the
appointment of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, the Int rna-
tional Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of Migrant Workers and their
Families, the sexual and reproductive
rights discourse, and the Tribunal on Vio-
lence Against Women during the Vienna
Human Rights Conference add new dimen-
sions to the existing human rights concep-
tual framework.
A number of the new instruments
directly address the political needs of
women while others more specifically
address the economic and social needs of
w men. These new instruments also indi-
cate the recognition of the cross cultural
nature of women's concerns and an urgency
in addressing issues of women's rights
across international boundaries. It is worth
n ting that a majority of countries in the
w rld, 131 in number, have ratified
CEDAW, although in the South Asian
context, Sri Lanka stands as an exception in
that it has ratified the Convention without
any reservations. India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh have reservations on Article 16
of CEDAW.
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The Sri Lankan Context
One of the few acts at the state level in Sri
Lanka since it became a signatory to
CEDAW in 1979 has been the drawing up,
14 years later, of the Sri Lanka Women´s
Charter, which was approved by Parlia-
ment in 1993. Although the Charter re-
mains at the level of a document with no
legal power, there have followed a number
of legal reforms, or attempts at legal re-
forms designed to contribute to the
strengthening of women´s rights. The
recoginition of sexual harassment in the
workplace as a legal issue can be regarded
as a positive step in enhancing women´s
rights along with an increasing number of
gender sensitisation programmes being
carried out by NGOs targeting both the
public and private sectors, including State
legal practitioners. In the post Beijing era,
the Sri Lankan government, through the
National Committee on Women, has ex-
erted a considerable effort to draw up a
National Plan of Action for Women
(Draft) (1996) in consultation with
women's NGOs. The National Plan of
Action for Women is still to be presented
to Parliament.
Many of the issues addressed in both the
Women's Charter as well as the National
Plan of Action on Women (Draft) reflect
the issues set out in CEDAW and the
Beijing Platform for Action. There is a
growing trend to incorporate a special fo-
cus on women's needs in policy relating to
food security, housing, employment. health
etc.
Development and Women´s Rights:
An Overview
I attempt here to look briefly at the impact
of some of the principal human rights issues
of women in relation to the economic and
social dimensions of Sri Lanka's develop-
ment paradigm. The Constitution of Sri
Lanka (1978), which sets out the broad
political framework of the country, is a
useful starting point in looking at the con-
ceptualisation of rights and non-discrimina-
tion. Coomaraswamy (1994) notes that
while the principles of non-discrimination
are clearly set out, in so far as women are
concerned, the Constitution after a general
nondiscrimination clause presents the
'problem' in the following manner:
"Nothing in this Article shall prevent
special provision being made by law, sub-
ordinate legislation or executive action for
the advancement of women, children and
disabled persons."
Coomaraswamy (1994) argues that this
juxtaposition of women with children and
the disabled shows up the 'duality' present
in Sri Lankan law relating to women. As
she observes: "On the one hand, there is
non-discrimination and an assertion of
women's equality with men. On the other
hand, there is the belief that woman is vul-
nerable and needs protection." Set, as it is,
within the discourse on women's human
rights, and the international and national
mechanisms designed to set out and safe-
guard their rights, this is perhaps an omi-
nous prelude in the process by which
women´s issues and concerns are incorpo-
rated into the national framework.
The Women's Charter and the Sri
Lanka National Plan of Action for
Women (Draft) are two key documents
which are useful indications of the state's
recognition, at the policy level, of the im-
portance of directing attention to women's
concerns. The concept of gender has been
gaining a degree of acceptability within the
women's rights discourse in the country.
But much of the development plans
adopted by the state continue to be formu-
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lated along the lines of the Women in De-
velopment approach where, in line with
liberal concepts of equality for women and
men, stress is laid on women and men
having equal opportunities such as, for ex-
ample, in education and income. Underly-
ing this approach is the assumption that
access to education and literacy would en-
able women to be equally qualified as men,
while access to income would improve the
economic productivity of women and en-
able the state to utilise the potential of
women for economic development.
When one applies the women´s rights
framework in an overview of the current
state efforts in the three areas of education,
income and poverty alleviation, it becomes
apparent that the mere provision of equal
access to women and men does not
guarantee that women reap the same bene-
fits from these opportunities as men do.
This is the crucial point. What is becoming
clear is that, unless there are complemen-
tary enhancements of women's abilities and
rights in other spheres parallel to that of
education, income and poverty alleviation,
the benefits will not be fully reaped. The
need for complementary developments is
particularly urgent in the political sphere at
all levels ranging from the power relations
in the family/household, to community-
based institutions, and to the political in-
stitutions at national level. Without an ade-
quate (equal) representation of women´s
need and interests in the political sphere,
gender equitable processes in parallel
spheres cannot be fully effective.
Sri Lanka is often cited as a country
where a high rate of utilisation of health
services by women at child birth is seen to
be closely linked to the mother's level of
schooling.61 It is also often observed that
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National Household Survey (1993): Indicators
the relatively low population growth rate in
the country, as compared with those of
other South Asian countries, is associated
with a high level of female literacy. The
assumption here is that a woman's access to
education per se leads here to having a
fewer number of children. This does not
address the question whether the woman
has a choice as to the number of children
she desires to have, i.e. whether her family
should be 'large' or 'small' or, whether the
size of her family has already been decided
by agents other than herself.
It is important to understand that the de-
cision on family size is often not based on a
woman's level of literacy. Gender ideology,
cultural practices and household economics
exert considerable influence on family size
verriding the individual woman's ability to
x rcise her right in the decision-making
process62. It should also be noted that the
reportedly high incidence of (illegal) septic
abortions in the country is another indica-
tion that more measures need to be taken to
ensure that women (whether married or
single) have the environment to exercise
their rights as individuals to control their
bodies63.
The right of women to engage in eco-
omic activities for financial benefit on par
with that of men is an important recogni-
tion of women's economic capabilities and
their role as social actors within the com-
munity. Both the Women's Charter and
the National Plan of Action for Women
                                                                    
on Selected World Summit Goals for Children
and Women (Colombo)
62 The Education and Training component of the
National Plan of Action for Women (Draft) is
perhaps one of the most comprehensive
attempts at breaking gender stereotyping
within that area.
63 National Plan of Action for Women (Draft)
(1996)
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(Draft) stress women's right to training, to
appropriate technology and remuneration
on par with men. There is a general
assumption here that women's right to in-
come would lead to an enhancement of her
status and role as a decision-maker within
the household/family/community.
The situation/status of women in the
plantation sector presents an interesting
example where there has been an 'equal-
ising' of wages for men and women after
more than 100 years of discriminatory
wage rates. However, the continuing prac-
tice of men collecting women's wages in the
plantation community (despite agitation by
various women's groups) clearly shows that
without accompanying change in the social
practices at the household and community
level accompanied by a more gender repre-
sentative structure at the decision-making
levels of trade unions active in the planta-
tion sector women may find it hard to re-
alise their rights as income earners. At pre-
sent, given the non-representation of
women within these decision-making
structures and the pervasive ideology of
women's secondary role, women do not
have access to or control over their income.
Hence, at the level of the household
community the concept of women's rights
remains alien.
At the macro-economic level, the Sri
Lankan State is one of the first in South
Asia to undertake a Structural Adjustment
Programme with a view to balancing na-
tional expenditure and embarking on rapid
economic development. One of the key
elements of SAP is the cutting down of
state expenditure on (and therefore
accountability for) social welfare pro-
grammes, which are then expected to be
taken on by the private sphere including the
household unit in which women are ex-
pected to shoulder these responsibilities.64
As in other Third World countries, the Sri
Lankan State has also introduced poverty
alleviation programmes to counter the ad-
v se impact of these policies on house-
olds in poverty.65
Both the Janasaviya Poverty Allevia-
tion programme, which was implemented
from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, as
well as the Samurdhi Poverty Alleviation
programme currently being implemented,
take the household as the basic social unit.
An underlying assumption here, which can
be linked to the Liberal political vision of
non-discrimination within domestic units/
families (as per universal human rights) is
that household members have equal access
to resources whether in terms of food,
housing, clothing or distribution of income.
I  accordance with this assumption, it is
deemed that the investment opportunities
and financial assistance for enhancing
household consumption levels provided by
these poverty alleviation programmes, will
be used by the inmates of households for
the betterment of the household. This view
verlooks the dynamics of gender power
relations within the household and the cir-
cumstances which particularly obstruct
women in exercising their rights within the
domestic unit. Such imbalances in gender
power relations result in differential access
for women and men to both the resources
and skills training which such programmes
re committed to provide. There is in-
creasing evidence from surveys and studies
that the gender biased politics of the
household and the community more often
than not, failed to mitigate the unequal
distribution of resources within the
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domestic unit.66 When such gender politics
are laid out alongside the impact of overall
structural adjustment policies on women, it
is clear that issues of women's rights need
to be incorporated and articulated at a
much broader level along with a critical
evaluation as to the real constraints such
economic development policies place on
the women's ability to exercise their rights.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
I have attempted here to look at some of
the arguments for the representation and
incorporation of women's rights and con-
cerns at the household, community and
state level in the Sri Lankan context. What
we have seen is a growing acknowledge-
ment at the international and national levels
of the existence of women and an increas-
ing mobilisation of efforts to bring to focus
that these are women's human rights. What
we also see are numerous examples where
violations of women's rights are common-
place with little or no redress from the po-
litical institutions in countries that are sig-
natories to International Human Rights
Declarations, Human Rights Covenants or
Conventions designed to protect the rights
of women. Coomaraswamy's account of
four cases of violations of women's rights
in South Asia very concisely points to the
importance of taking into account the po-
litical and cultural factors in the realisation
of women's rights as human rights.67
Although the Sri Lankan State is a sig-
natory to CEDAW and has taken signifi-
cant steps to draw up a Women's Charter
setting out basic rights and conditions for
the advancement of women, there has been
little accompanying change within the
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existing legal framework to enact the provi-
sions set out in these documents. There is
l tle knowledge about the state's commit-
ment to the principles of women's rights in
either the public or private spheres. The
delay in the development of the Women's
Charter into a legally binding act can be
attributed to the fact that the very concepts
and rights which are highlighted are being
regarded as posing serious challenges to
existing gender discriminatory but well en-
trenched laws and social customs in the
c untry.
It is also pertinent to point out that
women's economic and social rights sup-
ported in the state policy papers must be
accompanied by systematic complementary
r presentation of women`s interests and
concerns in the political sphere at all levels
of society from the household up to the
national level. The recent failures of the
st te's attempts to reform the existing laws
r lating to divorce and to rape are clear
examples of the lack of coherent under-
standing of, and commitment to, the issue
of women's human rights.
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Political Conditionality of Aid:
Blackmail or Imperative of Uni-
versal Human Rights?
Franz Nuscheler
The subject of this article68 - the linking of
foreign aid and human rights - is a very
controversial one. The reasons for the con-
troversy are as different as are the interests,
positions and perceptions of various politi-
cal actors in national politics and interna-
tional relations. For illustration a few
examples:
1. Whereas Aung San Suu Kyi's democ-
racy movement in Myanmar calls on the
West to exert economic and political
pressure on the military government by
denying aid, the governments of the
ASEAN states are strictly against such
political interference on behalf of human
rights. Whereas the West awarded her
the Nobel Prize for Peace, the ruling
elites of the region condemn her as a
political trouble-maker and as a risk to
stability. They confront the universality
of human rights with the particularity of
"Asian values". Like China, the
ASEAN-group has more and more in-
fluence in world politics and in the in-
ternational debate on human rights.
2. Everywhere in the world, human rights
groups are at odds with governments
that either violate human rights or toler-
ate that violation for economic or dip-
lomatic reasons. The German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been much
criticised at home and by Indonesian
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human rights groups for backing Presi-
dent Suharto's view that there are
different human rights concepts as a re-
sult of different cultural values. The
reason for this concession to cultural
relativism was, of course, the fear that
political conditionality might jeopardise
German business interests in an eco-
nomically attractive region.
3. But the controversy about the justifica-
tion of political conditionality of aid
does not only divide donor and recipient
countries, but also the intelligentsia. For
instance, Wole Soyinka, the Nigerian
winner of the Nobel Prize for literature,
untiringly calls on the West to put
pressure on the dictators in his own and
other countries. The African intelli-
gentsia, however, is divided: part of
them support Soyinka's view, for others
political conditionality is just another
word for political blackmail and impe-
rialism.
4. There are also considerable differences
between donor countries, not so much
in principle, but rather in the application
of principles. Japan's ODA-Charter of
1992 contains everything, which decla-
rations of the DAC (Development
Assistance Committee) of the OECD
and of the EU contain: ODA should aim
at promoting democracy and human
rights standards. And yet Japan applies
conditionality much more cautiously
than the West and claims to follow Art.
II.7 of the UN Charter as a higher-
ranking principle.
5. An unconditional backing of political
conditionality is only to be found with
human rights groups - such as Amnesty
International. They do not go for com-
promise; they are not impressed by eco-
nomic or diplomatic interests nor by so-
called "Asian values" or "Islamic
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values", which are often referred to in
order to give substance to the concept
of cultural relativism. They accuse the
West of entertaining "double standards"
in human rights matters - and they
rightly do so.69
I shall concentrate my reflections on po-
litical conditionality on the following
questions:
1. What is the meaning and what is the
political background of political condi-
tionality?
2. What are the legal, political, and ethical
justifications for it in spite of the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in internal
affairs as laid down in Art. II.7 of the
UN Charter?
3. What are the factors that limit its appli-
cation?
4. The credibility of political conditionality
is jeopardised by "double standards".
What is the responsibility of the donor
countries?
5. What can be done by the local and in-
ternational civil society to protect and
promote human rights?
1 Background of political condi-
tionality
For the majority of the developing coun-
tries the conditionality of aid is not at all a
new experience. The donor community has
always transported and transplanted with
money, projects and experts its interests
and its concept of development. The re-
cipient could offer requests, but the donors
selected and decided. It is a matter of
course: Aid was never given uncondition-
ally.
The sovereignty of recipient countries
has been eroded by the economic condi-
tionality imposed by the IMF and the
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World Bank, and by structures of he-
gemony and dependency in international
r lations. The debt crisis forced most de-
veloping countries to apply for standby-
loans from the Bretton Woods-Institutions.
These loans were linked to a strict form of
economic conditionality in the shape of
structural adjustment programmes.70 Of
course, these adjustment conditions were
far from being purely economic, because
they had far-reaching effects on social poli-
cies and the political stability of the debtor
countries. The Report of the South Com-
mission on "The Challenge of the South"
(1990) called the structural adjustment
policy a form of "neo-colonialism" over
against formally sovereign debtors. But
even critics of the IMF did not deny the
inevitability of structural reforms. Willy
Brandt (1985) formulated the dilemma in a
classic manner: "If the IMF comes, it is
bad; if it doesn't come or if it comes too
late, it is even worse."
During the Cold War the Western donor
countries applied a strategic version of po-
litical conditionality, which was more or
less counter-productive for the protection
of human rights: This "double standard"
spared dictatorships as long as they were of
strategic importance and acted pro-
Western, but punished pro-Soviet regimes
with a variety of sanctions, which the West
commanded as a result of its economic su-
periority and its dominating influence on
the Multilateral Development Banks.
The guiding principle of the "double
standard", which tended and fostered many
dictators as "friends of the West", was, in
President Kennedy's words: "Somoza is a
swine, it is true, but he is our swine." That
"double standard" was at least in part re-
sponsible for the survival of repressive and
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corrupt "Dracula regimes" and thus also
responsible in part for the abuses of "bad
governance", in which, at the end of the
eighties, the World Bank saw a major ob-
stacle to development.
There is no question that dictatorships in
the Third World were products both of
internal structures and of massive support
from outside. It is necessary to remember
this pre-history of political conditionality,
because its credibility gap is partly due to
that history. The "teaching and preaching
culture" of the West sometimes has a short
memory. It was only after the end of the
Cold War, that Western politicians started
to call more and more openly for a linkage
of aid to political reforms. The collapse of
the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe
rendered the strategic version of political
conditionality unnecessary. Of even greater
importance was the collapse of many dic-
tatorial regimes in the Third World, which
was brought about by pressure from two
different, but interrelated sides: the internal
pressure by civic movements, which in turn
was reinforced by external pressure. Many
dictators might have been able to deal with
the internal opposition by means of repres-
sion, but their economic plight forced them
to give way to external pressure by the do-
nor countries.
The Meaning of Political Conditio-
nality
In 1990 two international documents
- mainly, if not exclusively, prepared by
political and academic sages of the South -
were published, in which special attention
was given to the interrelationship between
economic, social, and political (or more
precisely: democratic) development:
· The Report of the South Commission,
chaired by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,
stated that democracy and the respect
for human rights are a "must for devel-
opment".
· The first Human Development Report
of UNDP, which was elaborated under
the guidance of Mahbub ul Haq, defined
human development as "enlarging
people's choices". These choices include
political freedom, participation, and the
respect for human rights. It should be
remembered that UNDP, under the
pressure of authoritarian Third World
regimes, had long strictly rejected po-
litical conditionality as a means of en-
forcing human rights.
It was now easy for the donor countries
to justify their new doctrine of political
conditionality. In accordance with this un-
d rstanding of development as expressed in
the Report of the South Commission and in
the Human Development Report (and in
many other reports and declarations) the
European Council declared, in November
1991, the promoting of human rights and
democratic reforms a principal goal of
foreign aid. Political conditionality should
serve three objectives:
· Respect for human rights (in particular
the eradication of torture, safe-guarding
the due process of law, the protection
of minorities and freedom of religion).
· Participation of people in political de-
cision-making (by free elections, free-
dom of association for parties, trade
unions and other interest groups, free-
dom of the press).
· Legal security by establishing the rule
of law and good governance (i.e.
accountablility and transparency of
government actions).
This European Council resolution of
199171 made an important distinction: It
gave priority to a positive approach by
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supporting the democratization process. At
the same time it did not rule out a negative
approach in the case that regimes are not
willing to undertake reforms, continue to
violate human rights severely, do not live
up to the principles of good governance
and spend too much money by the cutting,
suspending or cancelling of aid or other
schemes of cooperation (like publicly
guaranteed export credits, debt releases
etc.). If the "development state" proves to
be a "state without development", which
wastes and abuses foreign aid (i.e. the
money of foreign tax-payers), there remain
only two remedies: the complete stop of aid
or a strict conditionality.
2 What are the legal, political and
moral justifications for political
conditionality?
There is one crucial point: The more a
country is dependent on foreign aid, the
more it is vulnerable and exposed to pres-
sure from outside, the more the political
conditionality conflicts with the principle of
non-intervention. The principle becomes a
matter of power beyond theoretical reflec-
tions.
A scholar of the Tokyo University ques-
tioned principally the compatibility of po-
litical conditionality as laid down in the
Japanese ODA-Charter with the principle
of non-intervention of Art. II.7 of the UN
Charter.72 To him the "negative linkage" by
cancellation or suspension of aid consti-
tutes an illegal intervention or even a
"dictatorial interference" in the following
cases:
· if it touches upon a matter within the
domestic jurisdiction of the recipient
country;
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· if it is effective in bringing about a
policy change.
This is the crucial point. The purpose of
p litical conditionality is to bring about
policy changes. If this purpose should con-
stitute an "illegal intervention", the IMF
and World Bank would then have to be
taken to the International Court in The
Hague.
This very conservative and legalistic in-
terpretation of Art. II.7 as a superior prin-
iple does not represent the mainstream in
the international legal debate. Other schools
of thought emphasize Art. I.3 of the UN
Charter which submits all UN members (the
international community) to the objective
to respect human rights and basic liberties.
Regional human rights declarations ex-
plicitly accept the universality of human
rights. The Declaration of the World Con-
ference on Human Rights in Vienna, which
was passed with the consent of 171 delega-
tions, not only confirmed the principle of
universality but also the legitimacy of inter-
national efforts to protect human rights.
The Vienna Conference developed a sym-
biosis of the "Human Right to Develop-
ment" and a human rights-based develop-
ment cooperation.
Nevertheless the linkage of aid and hu-
man rights developed into an explosive
matter in the North-South-relations. Art. 5
of the Declaration of Human Rights drafted
by parliamentarians of the ASEAN in 1993
states that "the respect for human rights
must not be made a prerequisite for eco-
nomic cooperation and development aid".
In view of the painful experiences of
colonialism and neo-colonialism, the em-
phasis which many Third World-regimes
place on non-intervention is quite under-
standable. Since the end of the Cold War
they feel under even greater pressure from
the North. Fears about the North using
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human rights as an instrument of disciplin-
ing the Third World were increasing.
Political leaders of the South condemn po-
litical conditionality as patronising and
blackmail; they now complain of a "double
conditionality" after the ordeal of the
structural adjustment measures. Indeed,
behind the "double conditionality" emerged
the objective to connect the global market
economy with liberal democracy and thus
to bring about the "end of history" accord-
ing to the historic vision of Francis
Fukuyama (1993).
The critical question of the legitimacy of
external interference for the protection of
human rights has a cultural as well as a
legal and political dimension. Historically it
is true that human rights are closely bound
up with Western culture, with the history of
enlightenment and with the evolution of
constitutional government. But the cata-
logue of human rights, which are now part
of the international law, has been developed
by the United Nations with the participation
and consent of the Third World. A com-
parative analysis of constitutional law
shows that most constitutions incorporate
this catalogue of human rights. The logical
consequence is: In legal terms, political
conditionality can be justified by the fact
that the Human Rights Covenants have
become, through ratification, part of the
constitutional law of most countries in the
world. This ratification includes a commit-
ment over against the international commu-
nity to protect human rights. If they violate
human rights they also violate international
law.
As a result of the Kurdish tragedy in
Northern Iraq and of the tragedies on the
Balkans and in Central Africa the interna-
tional legal debate moved towards recog-
nizing the primacy of human rights (i.e. the
rights of the people) over the sovereignty
of states. The "new interventionism", which
has emerged after the end of the Cold War,
was based on this new understanding of
sovereignty, of the rights of states and of
the obligations of the international commu-
nity.73
It is quite obvious that many authori-
tarian regimes invoke non-intervention in
internal affairs merely in order to conceal
gross violations of human rights, which
have nothing to do with particular political
traditions or religious values. As a Euro-
pean I would like to add: Who maintains
that human rights do not fit non-Western
s cieties, is preaching just another kind of
racism, because he does not respect the
desire of Asians, Arabs or Africans for
freedom and human security.
In addition to this legal justification
there is also a political justification for in-
erference aiming at the protection of hu-
man rights. The concept of human devel-
opment, which has been elaborated by
UNDP, equates development with human
security, which includes political and social
human rights. The quintessence is: Without
th  realization of human rights there is no
real human development (which is much
more than economic growth). On the
World Food Summit in Rome the repre-
s ntatives of the European Union declared
that democracy, human rights and stamping
out corruption were essential in the battle
against hunger. If this analysis should be
correct, the hunger in the world would
provide an additional justification for con-
ditionality.
If the purpose of aid is to promote hu-
man development, consequently the donors
and recipients have to take care of human
rights. The Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights and the "20/20-Initia-
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tive", which was approved by the Social
Summit of Copenhagen, also subject the
donor countries to the obligation to invest
more aid in social development. But, of
course, there is a decisive difference
between donors and recipients: only the
donor can exert effective pressure.
Human rights movements often call on
the donors to interfere on behalf of human
rights. This call is reinforced by the NGO
network in the North. The donors are un-
der pressure of a monitory public opinion.
This lobbying of a global human rights
network might legally still be irrelevant, but
politically it is relevant. The international
civil society is a new player in international
relations, which plays a substantial part in
the emerging global governance structure.
This was the central message of the Report
of the Commission on Global Governance
(1995) on "Our Global Neighbourhood".74
The precon-dition for a "global neighbour-
hood" are common values.
The process of globalization is eroding
the traditional principle of sovereignty and
produces a system of interdependence and
mutual intervention, which is no longer
consistent with Art. II. 7 of the UN
Charter. A legalistic perception of political
conditionality, which denounces it as an
"illegal intervention", turns a blind eye on
political realities. Globalization, which is
producing a deregulated world economy, a
borderless world society, and a hotchpotch
world culture, means a systematic, struc-
tural, and mutual intervention in all areas of
international relations. Human rights must
be made the combining and binding value
system of this emerging global village.
Otherwise Darwinistic rules of the game,
i.e. the rules of a predatory world capi-
talism, which follow the principle of the
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"survival of the fittest", would dominate the
international relations.
The universality of human rights, which
constitutes a kind of global ethics, inevita-
bly leads to a moral obligation to promote
uman rights everywhere in the world. In
the "new world order" borders and the
"holy sovereignty" lose their traditional
significance. In this "new world order" the
rights of people count more than the rights
of states. This is, of course, not yet a real-
ity, but a vision. But the international civil
ociety needs such a vision and orientation.
3 Limits to the application of po-
litical conditionality
If we analyse the problem in more detail, it
becomes evident that the controversy on
political conditionality is not so much about
WHETHER there should be conditionality
but about HOW it should be applied, about
the question whether it is wise or counter-
productive and whether it is feasible.75
Should possible sanctions be based on
situational indicators (such as the frequency
of torture) or on trend indicators (such as
the decrease or increase of cases of tor-
ture)? How can the obvious danger be
avoided that the donors use conditionality
as a tool of interests?
Is the Japanese preference for a
"positive approach" not only more com-
patible with Art. II.7 of the UN Charter,
but also more effective? The Japanese
government has used diplomatic pressure
as the primary method of implementing its
ODA Charter, has given preference to
"silent diplomacy" and has used the
"negative approach" only in a few cases -
and never against economically and politi-
cally important countries. After the
massacres on Tiananmen Square and in
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Eastern Timor the Japanese government
only expressed "diplomatic concerns". If
dictatorial regimes can be sure that an im-
portant donor is reluctant to impose sanc-
tions, it will not change its policy and easily
resist the pressure of other donors. Indone-
sia for example used the promise of Japan
not to impose sanctions to kick out the
Netherlands and make them look like a
fool.
Let me clarify my position: "Positive
measures" ought to be given preference.
Before the application of the "negative
approach" there should be an intensive po-
litical dialogue. But if a regime continues
grossly to violate basic human rights, there
must be some "negative measure", other-
wise conditionality is toothless and useless.
The decision to impose "negative
measures" must take into account who the
victims of sanctions will be. If there is
reason to fear that repressed people will
suffer even more as a result of the cutting
of aid, other ways or detours will have to
be found, for example giving more support
to NGOs.
What must also be kept in mind when the
type and extent of sanctions are considered
is the question whether they would do harm
to opposition groups. Experience shows,
however, that opposition groups do not
benefit when dictators are spared. China is
a telling example.
Up to now, the debate on political con-
ditionality has been dominated by negative
sanctions, that is to say that regimes which
grossly violate human rights should be
punished by stopping or cutting aid. It is
essential that any temptation to impose
specific political structures (such as a multi-
party system) should be resisted. I do not
think it right or wise to try to enforce, be-
yond basic human rights, the introduction
of a Westminster model of democracy. This
does not only violate the right to self-de-
termination, but also meets with a funda-
mental problem: Democracy cannot be or-
dered from above and from outside., but
has to develop from the grassroots. As an
Nigerian scholar stated for sub-Saharan
Africa: "The implementation of political
conditionality can only serve as a facilitator
for the transition to democracy".76 It
cannot do more, but this facilitating
function should not be underestimated.
The donor community can improve the
framework for democratization by various
measures:
· firstly by a positive discrimination of
regimes ready to undertake reforms and
to improve their human rights records
(e.g. Sri Lanka for signing the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights);
· secondly by easing the financial pres-
sure to which many developing coun-
tries are exposed and which is a hazard
to the survival of democracies, espe-
cially by means of a substantial reduc-
tion of the debt burden. The discussion
on political conditionality does not take
full account of the fact that there is a
correlation between political and social
human rights, which are indivisible in
principle, but divided in social reality.
The promotion of democracy is a good
starting point, but not enough for its
consolidation.
· Thirdly, a human rights-oriented devel-
opment cooperation can contribute to
an improvement of the human rights
situation by means of positive measures:
by supporting human rights groups and
monitoring organizations, by legal as-
sistance for the judicial system, by tech-
nical assistance for the organization of
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elections etc. The advantage of this
"positive approach" is that it bolsters
existing movements and trends towards
democratization.77 Of course this
"positive approach" is confined to limits
as an authoritarian regime can submit
local and foreign NGOs to strict con-
trol. If they are considered a nuisance
by the government they are always on
the verge of being outlawed or kicked
out.
4 The problem of "double stan-
dards"
Criticism in donor countries of the linking
of aid and human rights is directed not so
much at the idea as at the gap between the
idea and reality. Examples of regimes in
which gross violations of human rights
occur daily, but which nevertheless get a
great deal of aid, are easy to find. This
"double standard" is far from being in
accordance with the categorical imperative
of human rights.
If political conditionality is only directed
at economic "have-nots" and political
weaklings, it loses all its credibility and
legitimacy. If human rights are sacrificed on
the altar of diplomacy and profit - as is the
case with China, Indonesia, or Nigeria -,
then they are downgraded to a bargaining
chip. This is also true of the argument that
trade is good for political change. We
know now that sanctions did not play a
minor role in bringing down the Apartheid
regime in South Africa.
In the context of the credibility and effi-
ciency of political conditionality another
problem arises: the problem of coordination
among the donor countries. If cuts by Ger-
many or any other EU member state are
counter-balanced by Japan, the overall
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effect will probably be more or less nil. This
was the case in Sri Lanka in the early nine-
ties, when pressure from the USA and
Germany was neutralised by Japan, the
biggest donor.78
Since 1992 Japan has an ODA charter, it
is true, but in that charter market-friendly
r forms are rated much higher than
measures to protect human rights. In the
Annual Reports of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on ODA all one can find with re-
gard to Sri Lanka is the phrase "expression
of diplomatic concerns". Even among the
EU member states the coordination of aid
policies does not work, although the
Maastricht Treaty calls for a better coordi-
nation. As long as Western governments try
to snatch billion-worth orders from China
or Indonesia away from each other, all
appeals to respect human rights are nothing
but lip service, whose purpose it is to pac-
ify public opinion at home.
Because I defend the principle of politi-
cal conditionality I cannot defend the way it
is applied. I am not a stickler for principles,
and I do realise that it has prevented the
survival of many African dictatorships. But
it did not do so where there is oil: in
Nigeria. Even after the murder of Ken
Saro-Wiwa the EU could not bring itself to
impose sanctions. Political conditionality
was corrupted by economic interests.
How can we overcome this "double
standard"? I can see only two potential
solutions. First: To quit conditionality by
doing business as usual. This comfortable
solution is preferred by the business com-
munity, but not acceptable on ethical
grounds. Secondly: Politics acts under
pressure of interest groups. If the interna-
tional civil rights movement is unable to
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mobilize and organize sufficient pressure, it
will lose the battle for human rights.
5 What can be done by the inter-
national human rights lobby?
In the donor countries only an intensive
monitoring of governments by parliaments,
the media and NGOs can lessen the credi-
bility gap. The civil society is called upon
to take the challenge, but it is very hard,
also in the North, to prevail over economic
vested interests. The high unemployment in
the EU is one of the major factors that
counteract giving priority to human rights.
We need the criticism from human rights
groups in the Third World, because they
give us the legitimacy to act as advocates.
The obligation of "advocacy" is an essential
motive for campaigns, organized by
Anmesty International and other Human
Rights Organizations. The governments
cannot ignore these campaigns, because
they find quite some resonance in the me-
dia. What we need is mutual intervention.
If we prefer a "positive approach" of
promoting democracy and human rights,
we need an active civil society in the re-
cipient countries as agents of change. De-
mocracy has to be developed inside and
from below. All we can do is to support
human rights movements from outside by
various measures. It is then the job of
Northern NGOs to exert pressure on the
governments of the donor countries to
make them revise their "double standards",
so that human rights are no longer sold for
profits.
CONCLUSION
Since human rights as part of international
law can claim universal validity, it is not
only legitimate, but also imperative, to
subject dictators in every form or shape to
political conditionality. They cannot invoke
any political traditions or religious values,
because no tradition and no religion
approves torture or arbitrary arrest. But his
endorsement of political conditionality is
not unconditional: It must be restricted to
the protection of basic human rights and
must not be extended to the export of any
political or economic model; it must be
instrumental in trying to bring about more
human security.
Conditionality means intervention - and
intervention conflicts with sovereignty. I
am fully aware of the danger that political
conditionality might be taken as a licence
for interventionism and making use of the
plight of many developing countries. But if
basic human rights are grossly violated,
then the rights of people count more than
the rights of states - or better: the vested
interests of ruling classes. This is not only a
personal preference, but an option in
accordance with the global ethics enshrined
in the Vienna Declaration on the universal-
ity and indivisibility of human rights. De-
fending their universality I defend the con-
ditionality of aid - but not unconditionally.
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